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Abstract 
This paper examines how inequality from the interaction of income 
and housing circumstances changes the relative position of 
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1 Introduction 
So far, this programme of research has explored the theoretical and 
empirical relationships between income inequality and several concepts of 
poverty, and the mechanisms that might generate them. Earlier papers in 
Part 2 of the research programme have found positive empirical 
relationships between levels of cross-country income inequality and various 
definitions of poverty, and in the evolution of income inequality and income 
poverty over time (Karagiannaki, 2017; Yang and Vizard, 2017). Part 1 
reviewed theoretical mechanisms and the empirical evidence for them in 
economic, political and socio-cultural domains that might explain these 
observed positive net relationships, as well as some potential countervailing 
mechanisms. 
 
The focus of this part of the research programme is on analysing evidence 
for the specific mechanism of housing, by examining how inequality from 
the interaction of income and housing circumstances may influence the 
incidence and socio-demographic profile of those in housing-induced 
poverty. This is important because some households have a low income but 
low housing costs, for example, whereas other households face very high 
housing costs relative to their income. In this respect, measures of income 
and income inequality that account for differences in cost of living, of which 
housing is a key determining factor, are important for policy because they 
are arguably better measures of differences in standard of living than 
standard before housing cost (BHC) measures. Although BHC measures of 
income, income inequality and poverty rates are the standard for 
international comparisons, they fail to take into account the fact that 
different income groups face different cost-of-living patterns. 
 
In this paper, we therefore ask: How are inequality, poverty, and the 
relationship between the two affected by the net effect of housing costs 
and advantages, and what is their impact on standards of living? We re-
examine how inequality and poverty across socio-demographic groups and 
regions of the UK are measured and interpreted once costs and advantages 
associated with housing are taken into account. UK income statistics from 
the Family Resources Survey, published by the Department for Work and 
Pensions, include measures before and after housing costs have been 
deducted, allowing the effect of housing costs on the distribution of income 
to be analysed. Building on the work of Hills (1998), we also make income 
distribution comparisons using a measure that accounts for housing income 
(including imputed income to capture the benefits of being a homeowner 
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and subsidised rents to social tenants), and additionally consider actual 
realised housing income for second homeowners. Making these distinctions 
will allow us to draw more nuanced conclusions about the net effect of 
housing on the relationship between income inequality and poverty. 
 
We conduct an empirical analysis using the Family Resources Survey and 
its complementary Households Below Average Income dataset to profile the 
effects that housing-related costs and advantages have for different 
portions of the population. These effects are not taken account of in the 
standard BHC measure of disposable income, which is typically used for 
cross-country poverty and inequality analysis. As mentioned, we 
specifically investigate two alternative measures incorporating housing-
related costs and benefits: 
 
1) The After Housing Costs (AHC) measure produced by the Department 
for Work and Pensions, which deducts the value of housing-related 
costs from BHC disposable income such as rent and mortgage interest 
payments, and 
2) The With Housing Income (WHI) measure proposed by Hills (1998), 
which adds the value of in-kind advantages from housing to BHC 
disposable income. 
 
We profile these effects from several different perspectives. These include 
an examination of which types of households find themselves in 
substantially different positions in the income distribution AHC and WHI 
compared to BHC. In particular, we are interested in which of these 
households find themselves worse off, and which of these are re-ranked to 
positions of relative poverty once housing-related factors are accounted for. 
We investigate how factoring in housing-related costs and advantages 
changes the profile of the income distribution by region, tenure type, family 
type, and BHC income quintile. We also attempt to assess the extent to 
which realised rental income for second homeowners contributes towards 
inequality from diverging incomes between private landlords and tenants, 
though this is constrained by the extent to which rental income is accurately 
reported in the data. We focus on three years in the 10-year period from 
2006 to 2016. These are 2006-7, covering the year just before the financial 
crisis, the aftermath of the crisis and implementation of Housing Benefit 
reform in 2011-12, and the most recent available year of data covering 
2015-16. 
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The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 first reviews the 
literature on how housing costs and advantages could shape the 
relationship between inequality and poverty, and changes in recent Housing 
Benefit policy that could affect this relationship. Section 3 describes the 
AHC income measure, and the rationale and methodological issues of 
constructing the WHI measure and our empirical strategy for doing so. The 
empirical analysis of the distributional effects of housing costs and income 
on inequality and poverty measures is then presented using micro data for 
the UK in Section 4. Section 5 summarises 
  
 8 
2 Review of the effects of housing circumstances on 
income inequality and poverty 
When assessing differences in income across the population, we are usually 
interested in differences in standard of living across households. Similarly, 
when identifying the income-poor, we are also usually interested in 
focusing on groups with a low living standard. The distribution of living 
standards is affected by the housing system, housing costs, and the 
benefits in kind which people derive from housing, which are unlikely to be 
distributed in proportion to standard measures of disposable income across 
the population. Factoring in these considerations therefore affects the 
analysis of income distribution and poverty, both in terms of making cross-
sectional evaluations and making comparisons over time. Because most 
comparisons are made between disposable incomes, excluding some or all 
forms of housing costs or advantages, these may not provide an accurate 
reflection of living standards. For instance, those with high incomes may 
be more likely to be owner-occupiers (with significant imputed rents 
contributing to their standard of living) than those with low incomes, or 
conversely those with the lowest incomes may be more likely to occupy 
subsidised social housing, where gross rents are below those which would 
be charged in the private rental market. 
 
As mentioned, we will examine two alternative measures incorporating 
housing-related costs and advantages, the AHC and WHI measures 
introduced above. Existing evidence of the effects of housing as a 
mechanism influencing inequality and poverty tend to focus on either the 
AHC measure or on imputed rents (which are used in the WHI measure). 
Examples of exceptions are Hills (1998), which examines the effects of 
allowing for housing costs and housing income on poverty measurement 
for the UK and France in the 1980s, Stephens and van Steen (2011), which 
conducts distributional analysis of income measures incorporating housing 
costs and housing income for the UK and Netherlands, and Maestri (2015), 
which found in a cross-country study of 2010 EU data that including 
imputed rents in the income concept reduces inequality and poverty on 
average, while deducting housing costs from disposable income has the 
opposite effect. 
 
In the remainder of this section, we separately review evidence on the 
effects of housing costs and housing income on poverty and inequality, 
focusing on the UK, and briefly summarise recent changes to UK Housing 
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Benefit that impacts these housing-related effects. We first turn to housing 
costs. 
 
2.1 Housing costs 
There has been a trend of significant increases in housing costs relative to 
income over the last sixty years or so (Corlett and Judge, 2017). In 1961, 
the average family spent 6 percent of their income on housing costs, 
whereas today this has tripled to 18 percent. While increases have been 
recorded across most tenures, a striking disparity has opened up in the 
scale of these increases between those who own property and those who 
rent. Housing cost-to-income ratios have increased several times more for 
renters compared to homeowners. Private renters today spend on average 
36 percent of their income on housing, whereas for homeowners without a 
mortgage this is just 5 percent. Coupled with the fact that renters and those 
in the lowest income quintile BHC are most likely to be spending over half 
their net income on housing (Gardiner, 2014), this means the disparity in 
housing costs that magnifies inequality between renters at the bottom of 
the distribution and homeowners at the top also further drives down the 
living standards of those in poverty. 
 
In addition, while the rise in house prices from the 1990s to 2000s benefited 
homeowners who may have been able to improve their standard of living 
by cashing in some of the value of their home, the same cannot be said for 
renters. While rising house prices are good for those who own property 
(often the older generation), for those trying to get on the property ladder 
a higher percentage of their income is required to save for a deposit and 
pay a mortgage. Those who cannot afford to buy must rent, and therefore 
face higher housing costs of renting in a high-rent low-interest environment 
(Corlett and Judge, 2017) and entrench their positions of financial 
disadvantage. This means that the increase in inequality due to the 
interaction between rising house prices and the homeownership divide also 
exacerbates AHC poverty for those on the “wrong” side of this divide. Those 
who continue to rent will also face greater poverty in their retirement when 
they have to continue paying rent. 
 
On average, the evidence is that older people tend to spend less and 
younger people tend to spend more on housing because a much larger 
proportion of older individuals own their homes outright, or have a small 
outstanding mortgage and therefore face low interest payments (Cribb et 
al., 2017). The amount spent on housing also varies across other socio-
economic groups. In recent years, housing cost trends have been very 
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different for low and high-income groups. Housing costs have risen for low-
income households relative to high-income ones on average as higher-
earning households who tend to be owner-occupiers have benefited from 
sharp falls in mortgage interest rates (Belfield et al., 2015). The distinction 
between BHC and AHC measures has therefore become particularly 
important, as this increase in housing cost inequality has weakened the 
relative positions of poor households. 
 
A positive relationship has been found between the poverty rate and the 
home-ownership rate across eleven EU countries, and it has been 
suggested that home-ownership is being used as a supplement to state 
pensions (Watson and Webb, 2009). Kemeny (1995) and Castles (2004) 
have argued that less generous welfare systems, including less generous 
pension systems, are associated with countries with higher rates of home-
ownership. These findings imply that unequal incomes and high poverty are 
associated with high national homeownership, although association does 
not necessarily imply causation. 
 
The UK welfare system provides social housing at below-market rents for a 
minority of the population, and these rents remain relatively low as a 
household’s income increases. This avoids the disincentives that are implied 
by means-tested systems of assistance. In the UK case, with very steep 
rates of withdrawal of Housing Benefit as incomes increase, the higher 
someone’s rent is, the steeper the “poverty trap” they face. Their net gains 
from working more will often be greater, however, if they pay a lower rent. 
This effect has the most potential to impact high-demand and high-cost 
areas. The poverty trap facing private tenants on Housing Benefit is far 
wider in London than in the North of England, for example (Hills, 2007). 
 
There is also no evidence of a systematic relationship between housing 
costs relative to income and the quality and size of housing, and so it cannot 
be assumed that those people with higher housing costs relative to income 
also generally live in better quality or larger accommodation (Eurostat, 
2016). For example, IFS analysis of detailed data on housing characteristics 
in England show that, for the most part, increases in private rents paid 
since the early 2000s are not explained by improvements in the quality of 
property in the private rented sector. Rather, people generally seem to be 
paying more for similar properties (Joyce et al., 2017). 
 
Households in poverty as measured by BHC income are not necessarily the 
same as those in poverty as measured AHC income. For example, whilst 
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Northern Ireland has a relatively high proportion in relative income poverty 
(below 60 per cent of median income) using the BHC measure, its low 
housing costs mean that it has a below-average proportion in income 
poverty using the AHC measure. Conversely, whilst London has a below-
average proportion in low income using the BHC measure, its high housing 
costs mean that it is the region with the highest proportion in low income 
using the AHC measure (McKnight et al., 2017). 
 
Particularly in London, the inflow of property investment from overseas to 
the most desirable locations has led to disproportionate house price growth 
in comparison to the rest of the country. While in 2017, £500,000 would 
typically buy a two-bedroom flat in London, in Merseyside this could buy a 
six-bedroom house (Christie, 2017). We observe that “billionaires displace 
multi-millionaires from the top addresses, so they in their turn displace 
millionaires … and so housing wealth and the prime (real estate) effect 
spread” (Savills Research, 2011a). Analysis by the BBC has shown that of 
27,835 properties in the UK registered to overseas companies whose most 
recent sale prices are known, the total price paid was just over £55 billion 
(Verity and Stylianou, 2018) – just under £2 million per property on 
average. With this internationally driven increase in inequality through the 
housing market, we have also seen an increase in the inequality of 
residential floor space (Hills, 2016), as a relatively smaller number of upper 
and middle class households displace a relatively large number of poorer 
households. The effect of this is to drive up the housing costs and drive 
down the quality of housing that these displaced households would 
otherwise have been able to enjoy. Income AHC at the 10th percentile has 
fallen by 19 percent in London from 2007 to 2013 – a larger fall than at 
other points in the distribution and elsewhere in the country (Vizard et al., 
2015). 
 
Figure 1 shows the level of income inequality across regions, as measured 
by the percentage difference between median income in that region and in 
Great Britain as a whole using the most recent years of data from the FRS 
(both before and after housing costs are deducted). On a BHC basis, there 
are three distinct groups, though accounting for housing costs changes 
some of the details in important ways: 
 
 For the North, the Midlands and Wales, median BHC incomes are 
below the GB average. However, lower-than-average housing costs 
mean the gap between regional median income and overall median 
income is smaller on an AHC basis. 
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 Scotland, East Anglia and the South West have median BHC income 
around the same level as the GB average, while Scotland’s low 
housing costs mean that median AHC income in Scotland is higher 
than the GB median. 
 London and the South East have median BHC income higher than the 
GB median. However, the relative position of London changes 
dramatically after housing costs, with median AHC income in London 
dropping to 1 per cent below the GB median. This is not just the result 
of housing being more expensive in London – it also reflects 
differences in the mix of renting versus owner-occupation (including 
outright homeownership, where there are no mortgage payments). 
For example, while half of those in London live in rented 
accommodation, the figure is only 30% for the South East. 
 
Figure 1. Percentage difference between median income in regions 
of the UK and overall median income, 2013-14 to 2015-16. 
 
Source: Cribb et al.  (2017) 
Housing costs have also changed very differently for different kinds of 
households in recent years. This has affected inequality in the incomes that 
households have left over to spend on everything else. In particular, the 
sharp falls in mortgage interest costs between 2007-8 and 2009-10 led to 
a large reduction in the housing costs of owner-occupiers, and these tend 
to be relatively high-income households. Figure 2 illustrates how different 
trends are for incomes after housing costs are deducted (AHC), by plotting 
the change in income at each percentile point between 2007-8 and 2015-
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16 for both income measures. This shows that, although AHC income 
inequality has also fallen since the recession, it has fallen by far less than 
BHC income inequality (Cribb et al., 2017). 
 
Figure 2. Real income growth by income percentile before and after 
housing costs, 2007-8 to 2015-16. 
 
Source: Cribb et al.  (2017) 
The impacts on poverty of increasing inequalities in housing costs and 
housing wealth are not confined to the current generation. Those who stand 
to inherit property are also made better off, so that rising house prices may 
increase inter-generational wealth inequality. High house prices mean that 
there will be greater wealth inequality transmitted to the younger 
generation, dividing the population into those who inherit property from 
their parents and those who do not. Particularly if the rate of return on 
owning property, as measured by rental and imputed rental income, is 
greater than the rate of economic growth, this inequality is likely to widen 
(Piketty, 2014). With a widening of absolute differences in wealth, those 
with no or low wealth are left further behind (Hills et al., 2013).  
 
2.2 Housing-related advantages 
It has been argued that in-kind receipts of goods and services from all 
sources, not only employment, should be considered as part of people’s 
flows of income (OECD, 2011). According to this “comprehensive income” 
definition, the provision of social housing by government or free or reduced-
rent housing by family and friends would therefore be counted as income 
for those who benefit from them. Indeed, all types of housing provide a 
flow of benefits to residents, whether through ownership, tenancy or 
informal agreement, which means they avoid incurring other housing costs. 
The value of these benefits can be priced and considered as housing income 
(Hills, 1998). For example, some employers provide their employees with 
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free or low-cost housing as part of their compensation agreement. For 
owner-occupiers, the advantage of living in their homes can be calculated 
by imputing the rent that would have been charged and paid if the owners 
and occupiers were separate entities in the private rental market. Imputed 
rents are included as national income in the UK national accounts, and until 
the 1960s seen not only as a theoretical form of household income but 
taxed as such, under ‘Schedule A’ (Figari et al., 2012). Imputed rents are 
currently taxed in Greece and the Netherlands.  
 
Across EU countries, evidence suggests that if imputed rents were included 
in measures of household income, income inequality would be reduced 
(Frick et al., 2010, 2007; Frick and Grabka, 2003; Smeeding et al., 1993). 
The empirical analysis in this paper provides a detailed examination of this 
in the UK context. Figari et al. (2012) find in a simulation of six European 
countries that if imputed rents were included in calculations of household 
income and the tax revenue raised through taxation of imputed rent is 
redistributed to taxpayers through a lump sum credit, this would have an 
inequality-reducing effect on the distribution of incomes, with gainers 
mostly situated in the middle of the income distribution. However, in 
contrast they find that if the revenue is redistributed through a proportional 
tax liability rebate, then the effect appears to be regressive. For the UK, 
Mullan et al. (2009) find that accounting for the net value of housing income 
does not significantly reduce child poverty risk compared to the standard 
BHC income measure, although the composition of children counted as poor 
is different. In contrast, they find that three-quarters of pensioner poverty 
would be removed by this change in the calculation of income. 
 
Social housing residents who do not pay full market rents can also be 
described as receiving an imputed rent from the difference between their 
rent levels and market levels (Hills, 2007). In 2001, those in the bottom 
BHC income quintile received 8.1 times the benefit from social housing 
compared to those in the top quintile (measured here as the difference 
between rent levels and landlord costs). Sefton (2002) finds that this was 
the most redistributive aspect of in-kind welfare state benefits, with the 
ratio of top to bottom-quintile spending being 1.6 for the Right to Buy 
subsidy, 1.0 for education, 1.5 for health care, 1.3 for non-residential care, 
and 2.4 for residential care. Most social landlords also provide some 
services intended to prevent poverty and increase employment, such as 
money advice and debt prevention assistance to tenants (Chartered 
Institute of Housing, 2009), and many individual schemes appear effective 
(Tunstall et al., 2013). Taking these in-kind advantages of social housing 
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into account would have a mitigating effect on the numbers and type of 
people living in poverty, although gauging the total impact is difficult. 
 
2.3 Recent changes to Housing Benefit and Local Housing 
Allowance 
A number of recent changes to Housing Benefit allocation have impacted 
the housing costs faced by private tenants and rents received by private 
landlords. In order to reduce expenditure on Housing Benefit, in April 2011 
the government introduced new Housing Benefit payment caps by property 
size. The caps were: 
 
 £250 a week for a one bedroom property 
 £290 a week for two bedrooms 
 £340 a week for three bedrooms 
 £400 a week for four or more bedrooms 
 
Comparing these rental caps with average market rents across the UK, 
analysis suggests that only London exceeded these cap levels before the 
caps were introduced (Savills Research, 2011b). Northern Ireland did not 
introduce these caps due to difficulty in passing the legislation through the 
Northern Ireland Assembly (Kennedy et al., 2016). 
 
In contrast to the cap on benefit, the actual level of Housing Benefit paid 
in different locations is determined by the Local Housing Allowance (LHA). 
The LHA payable to the tenant is calculated according to market rents in a 
defined Broad Rental Market Area (BRMA), of which there are 193 in Great 
Britain. Before April 2011, the rate for different sizes of accommodation 
was set based on the median rent in the BRMA. Proposals put forward by 
the coalition government involved reducing the level at which LHA is set. 
From April 2011, alongside the Housing Benefit caps, changes in calculation 
of the LHA reduced the LHA from a median level (50th percentile) to the 
30th percentile. The maximum Housing Benefit available to tenants is 
determined by the lower of the LHA and the Housing Benefit cap. 
 
Private landlords are an important intermediate housing provider for those 
who do not qualify for social housing and cannot afford to buy. In the 
private sector 19% of tenants were in receipt of Housing Benefit in 2011, 
compared with 59% of households in the social rented sector. Since the 
LHA is not applicable to people receiving Housing Benefit in the social 
rented sector, the affected households were mostly tenants in the private 
rented sector who had made a new claim or changed address since April 
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2008, while social tenants in local authority or housing association 
accommodation remained unaffected (Savills Research, 2011b). 
 
A study of the impacts of the 2011 LHA reforms on existing claimants found 
that a year after being rolled onto the reformed system, existing claimants’ 
maximum entitlements in given property types were reduced by on average 
£6.84 per week. This was found to comprise of £0.79 in actual rent 
reductions and £6.06 in reduced LHA, implying that on average, tenants 
bore 89 per cent of the incidence of LHA reduction (Brewer et al., 2014). 
In contrast to most of the country, in London and the East Midlands the 
majority of the incidence fell on landlords rather than tenants in the short 
run. Findings also included evidence that groups impacted most heavily by 
the reforms (for a given type of property) have been those who had higher 
entitlements to start with – claimants in London and lone parents. 
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3 Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
The key datasets for this analysis are the Family Resources Survey (FRS) 
and the Households Below Average Income (HBAI) dataset. The FRS 
captures detailed information on income sources, as well as contextual 
information on household and individual living circumstances. The HBAI 
dataset is derived from the FRS data, and includes adjustment for top 
incomes using the Survey of Personal Incomes. Together, these allow for 
detailed analysis of housing cost components across the income distribution. 
Hfowever, while the records in the HBAI are at the ‘benefit unit’ level, the 
FRS contains data at the individual, benefit unit, and household level. We 
therefore link the two datasets by matching benefit units from the HBAI to 
their respective constituent individuals and containing households in the 
FRS in order to use variables from both datasets. 
 
We are interested in three concepts of income in our analysis – income 
before housing costs (BHC), after housing costs (AHC), and with housing 
income (WHI). Each of these is discussed in more detail below. For each 
measure, we use equivalised household disposable income, which takes 
into account the size and composition of households to make the income 
figures comparable. Incomes are assumed to be shared equally between 
everyone in the household. 
 
3.2 Before Housing Costs 
BHC income aggregates income from all household members, including 
dependants, and includes the following main components: 
 net earnings from employment and self-employment 
 all Social Security benefits and tax credits, including Housing Benefit 
 income from occupational and private pensions 
 investment income 
 maintenance payments, if a person receives them directly 
 income from educational grants and scholarships (including, for 
students, top-up loans and parental contributions) 
 the cash value of certain forms of income in kind (free school meals, 
Healthy Start vouchers and free school milk and free TV licence for 
those aged 75 and over). 
Income is net of the following items: 
 Income Tax payments 
 National Insurance contributions 
 Council Tax (or domestic rates for Northern Ireland) 
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 contributions to occupational pension schemes 
 all maintenance and child support payments, which are deducted 
from the income of the person making the payment 
 parental contributions to students living away from home 
 student loan repayments. 
 
3.3 After Housing Costs 
AHC income deducts a measure of housing costs from the BHC income 
measure. 
Housing costs include the following main components: 
 rent (gross of housing benefit) 
 water rates, community water charges and council water charges 
 mortgage interest payments 
 structural insurance premiums (for owner occupiers) 
 ground rent and service charges 
 
A BHC measure acknowledges that some households may choose to spend 
more on housing in order to enjoy a better quality of accommodation. On 
the other hand, variations in housing costs may not always reflect 
differences in the quality of accommodation (for example, geographical 
differences mean two households could face very different costs for a 
comparable standard of housing). In this case, an AHC measure is arguably 
more informative. Poverty levels are generally higher when household 
incomes are measured AHC, as households at the lower end of the income 
distribution tend to spend a larger share of their income on housing than 
higher-income households. 
 
AHC measures also partially remove the influence of housing benefits from 
the figures – when housing benefits rise to offset increases in rents, the 
before housing cost (BHC) measure counts this as an income rise (rather 
than no change), which can create misleading and perverse policy 
implications. The difference between AHC and BHC income is therefore an 
important distinction. 
 
An advantage of the AHC measure is that it removes distortions between 
tenants with the same net housing costs, but subsidised through different 
routes (housing allowances as opposed to below-market rents). In the UK 
this has been important in making income distribution comparisons over 
time periods when there have been shifts from ‘bricks and mortar’ subsidies 
to income-related housing allowances, as there were over the 1980s. 
However, a disadvantage of AHC measures is that they only give a fair 
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comparison of relative living standards between households if they occupy 
accommodation of the same quality or value. The fact that a household has 
little in the way of net resources left over for other forms of consumption 
because it has chosen to spend most of its income on living in a luxury 
apartment in the centre of a capital city does not mean that it is appropriate 
to place it ‘in poverty’ by comparison with another household with slightly 
higher AHC income, but occupying low cost accommodation. 
 
Individuals living in Local Authority (LA) and Housing Association (HA) 
accommodation benefit from paying rents that are below the market rate. 
This effective economic subsidy is in addition to any Housing Benefit 
received, which is already included in household disposable income. The 
subsidy, however, is not captured by BHC income, since it is reflected in 
the lower costs of rent that are not captured in this measure. While AHC 
income does capture the impact of the subsidy through the smaller rent 
component of housing for LA and HA tenants in comparison to private 
tenants, it does not tell us about the size of this subsidy. To measure this 
subsidy, we therefore estimate the market rental value of LA and HA 
housing using a hedonic regression model (see below), and deduct the 
rents actually charged by LAs and HAs. This is the approach taken in the 
With Housing Income measure, described below. 
 
3.4 With Housing Income 
As mentioned earlier, the WHI measure accounts for the value of in-kind 
advantages not otherwise reflected in the BHC disposable income measure. 
For owner-occupiers, the “housing income” advantages they receive is 
calculated as the net imputed rent on their property, which would 
incorporate real capital gains on the property, less real net interest 
payments on borrowing. Net imputed rent is an estimate of the market rent 
the property could command, deducting expenses like repair, maintenance 
and depreciation. Net interest payments would reflect the effects of any tax 
reliefs or subsidies benefiting owners with mortgages. Income would also 
include any income-related housing allowances received by owners. 
 
For a tenant paying a full market rent without any assistance from housing 
allowances or tax reliefs there would be no housing income. If the tenant 
received a housing allowance, this would contribute to income (and might 
or might not be included in BHC income measures). In addition, if tenants 
pay below-market rents, the difference between actual and market rent 
would also be part of housing income. Note that it is the difference between 
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actual rent and gross market rent which has to be estimated, since tenants 
typically do not normally have to bear the cost of repairs and maintenance. 
 
Note that while the HBAI data contains BHC and AHC-specific equivalence 
scales to compute equivalised BHC and AHC income, there is no WHI 
equivalence scale. As such, the BHC equivalence scale is used for WHI 
equivalisation, since economies of scale of a comprehensive income 
measure will be much more similar to BHC economies of scale than AHC 
economies of scale within households. 
 
The advantage of using imputed rents to calculate such a With Housing 
Income (WHI) measure is that is allows a fair comparison between 
households in different circumstances and between countries where 
institutional arrangements vary. Data limitations may, however, mean that 
its calculation can only be estimated with error. This is discussed in the 
following sections. 
 
3.5 Gross rent hedonic imputation model 
Information is not available on the value of rents that would be charged for 
LA and HA housing if they were made available on the private rental market. 
These therefore need to be estimated, based on the values of comparable 
properties in the private rental sector. 
 
We use the market rental value of property as a measure of the 
consumption value of living in that property. This value is observed in the 
data for those households who rent their property from a private landlord. 
But we do not observe a rental value for owner-occupiers, and, for tenants 
of “social landlords”, we observe a rent which will typically be less than the 
market rent. We therefore need to estimate the rent that owner-occupiers 
and social tenants would pay for their property if they rented it on the 
private market. 
 
We do this estimating a hedonic regression model, which imputes a rent 
for each property based on the geographical region, the number of rooms, 
property type, furnished status and the council tax bill. Following an 
approach similar to Brewer and O’Dea (2012), we take households who 
rent a property in the private market in each year, and split them into four 
groups defined by the education of the head of household and whether or 
not the property is located in London. For each group, we estimate a 
regression of the log of rent on council tax band interacted with a dummy 
for the regional council tax regime, indicators for government office region, 
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and indicators for the number of rooms in the property, property type and 
furnished status. Again following Brewer and O’Dea (2012), for all 
households we then calculate a measure of imputed (log) rent as the 
prediction from this regression plus a draw from the empirical distribution 
of the regression residuals (the draw for a particular household is a random 
draw from the sample comprising the residuals for all households surveyed 
in the same year and with the same education level). Regression results 
are provided in the Appendix. 
 
3.6 Calculating net imputed rent 
To calculate net imputed rents, we need to deduct the expenses that owner-
occupiers would face if they were letting and renting on the private market. 
The hedonic regression described gives us gross imputed rents, that is, the 
rents paid by tenants without factoring in the costs of running the property. 
In order to calculate the WHI measure, which requires net imputed rent, 
we therefore use estimates of landlord expenses to calculate the expenses 
that owner-occupiers would face if they were letting and renting on the 
private market. 
 
Table 1 provides up-to-date and comprehensive information from Kent 
Reliance for Intermediaries (2017), a specialist buy-to-let mortgage lender, 
about the costs necessary to calculate deductions from imputed rent for 
owner-occupiers. Shaded spending categories are usually either passed on 
to tenants (service charges and ground rent), or are not applicable to the 
circumstances of owner-occupiers (voids), and so are not included in the 
deductions to obtain net rents from gross imputed rents. Deducting the 
inapplicable categories of spending, the other categories comprise 72 per 
cent of total landlord costs (given by the calculation: 1 – (( 652 + 312 + 
62 ) / 3632 ) = 0.72 ). 
 
Concluding the derivation of the WHI measure, the final step is to adjust 
the gross rents imputed from the hedonic model by deducting the 
percentage of region-specific owner-occupier running costs given in the last 
column of Table 2. 
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Table 1. Annual cost of running the average rental property in Great 
Britain. 
Category of spending Cost of running a 
property 
Property upkeep, maintenance, 
servicing 
£1,025 
Letting agent fees £870 
Voids £652 
Service charges £312 
Other £198 
Insurance £181 
Utilities £170 
Legal/accountancy £121 
Ground rent £62 
Licensing fees £41 
Total £3,632 
Source: Kent Reliance for Intermediaries (2017) 
We then take the region-specific total cost of running a property normally 
paid by landlords as a percentage of rental income, and adjust this to reflect 
the costs owner-occupiers would face by taking 72 per cent of this figure, 
as explained above. Table 2 presents the region-specific average total 
landlord running costs and these costs as a percentage of rental income, 
and in the final column adjusted as a percentage of only the 72 per cent of 
included spending categories applicable to owner-occupiers. 
 
Table 2. Landlord and owner-occupier expenses as a ratio of rental 
income by region. 
Region Annual landlord 
running cost before 
mortgage 
As % of 
rental 
income 
Owner-occupier 
running costs 
(72%) 
London £6,535 32% 23% 
East of England £3,212 35% 25% 
South West £2,963 35% 25% 
Yorkshire and 
The Humber 
£2,508 34% 24% 
North West £2,483 33% 24% 
Wales £2,211 41% 30% 
South East £3,691 37% 27% 
North East £1,895 34% 24% 
West Midlands £2,785 33% 24% 
East Midlands £2,657 34% 24% 
Scotland £2,966 33% 24% 
Great Britain £3,632 34% 24% 
Source: Kent Reliance for Intermediaries (2017) and author’s own calculations 
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4 Analysis and discussion 
4.1 Housing and the income distribution 
In moving from the conventional BHC measure of income to measures that 
account for the effects of housing (the AHC measure and WHI measure 
including imputed rents and economic subsidies), the amount of 
adjustment will be affected by the tenure pattern across the population. In 
particular, if tenure varies with income, the shape of the AHC and WHI 
distributions may differ from that of the conventional BHC income 
distribution. 
 
Table 3 to Table 5 present the Gini, P90/P50 and P50/P10 measures of 
inequality in the years 2006-7, 2011-12 and 2015-16, to show the 
differences between the conventional BHC income distribution and each of 
the two housing-adjusted income distributions.1 The effect of using the AHC 
measure is to produce a substantially more unequal distribution, with the 
P50/P10 displaying particularly large increases relative to the BHC measure. 
Note that this is partly because the housing cost deductions in the AHC 
income measure are larger relative to BHC income for those with lower BHC 
incomes. This then affects the P50/P10, which captures dispersion in the 
bottom part of the distribution. In contrast to AHC inequality, the 
distribution of the WHI measures is very similar to BHC inequality, with the 
exception that P50/P10 inequality between the median and bottom decile 
widens in 2011-12 and 2015-16 relative to the BHC baseline. 
 
Income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient has remained constant 
over the three years examined in the 2006-2016 period, 2006-7, 2011-12 
and 2015-16. The P90/P50 inequality figures indicate that dispersion 
between the top decile and the median narrowed between 2006 and 2016, 
as the top decile fell more relative to the median between 2006-7 and 
2011-12 after the financial crisis, and then rose less relative to the median 
in the economic recovery between 2011-12 and 2015-16. The P50/P10 
figures, on the other hand, show a narrowing in the dispersion between the 
bottom decile and the median between 2006-7 and 2011-12, as median 
but not bottom decile incomes fell in the aftermath of the financial crisis, 
and then a widening again in 2015-16. These patterns are fairly consistent 
across income measures, whether housing is accounted for or not. The 
contrast between the relatively constant level of inequality measured by 
                                                 
1 To remain consistent with official DWP FRS-HBAI calculations, we measure inequality 
on an individual basis. Although each observation is a benefit unit, by using the 
appropriate grossing factor, totals for the number of individuals can be calculated. 
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the Gini and the changing decile ratios indicate that the changes in 
dispersion towards the tails of the income distribution were offset by 
changes nearer the centre of the distribution. These changes may be linked 
to changes in the relative fortunes of different tenure types in the 
distribution, and we turn to this in Table 6 to Table 8. 
 
Table 3. Income inequality for each of the three income concepts in 
2006-7. 
Measure Gini P90/P50 P50/P10 
BHC 0.35 2.07 1.99 
AHC 0.38 2.15 2.28 
WHI 0.35 2.08 2.00 
Source: Own calculations from FRS 
Table 4. Income inequality for each of the three income concepts in 
2011-12. 
Measure Gini P90/P50 P50/P10 
BHC 0.34 2.05 1.88 
AHC 0.38 2.16 2.24 
WHI 0.34 2.04 1.92 
Source: Own calculations from FRS 
Table 5. Income inequality for each of the three income concepts in 
2015-16. 
Measure Gini P90/P50 P50/P10 
BHC 0.35 2.00 1.92 
AHC 0.39 2.13 2.30 
WHI 0.34 2.00 1.95 
Source: Own calculations from FRS 
 
4.2 Re-rankings and relative poverty 
Table 6 to Table 8 present breakdowns by tenure type of the incidence of 
those who fall below 60 per cent of median income. Inspecting the 
incidence of low income across tenure types, we see that tenants comprise 
the majority of those in relative poverty, with the AHC measure producing 
particularly high figures, especially in relation to the baseline BHC 
incidences for private tenants. The WHI measures show reductions in the 
incidence of low income for social tenants, relative to the BHC baseline, as 
a result of factoring in the economic subsidy to social tenants for 2006-7 
and 2011-12. In 2015-16, however, this economic subsidy appears 
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insufficient relative to the imputed rents of higher-income households to 
reduce the incidence of WHI relative poverty for social tenants. 
 
Overall, the pattern of change in incidence of low income for tenants over 
the three years in the 2006-2016 period matches that of the changes in 
P50/P10 inequality, pointing to changes in inequality occurring in this part 
of the distribution being driven by the relative positions of tenants in the 
distribution. For homeowners, on the other hand, the incidence of low 
income has either remained fairly constant or fallen over the period. Overall, 
homeowners, particularly outright owners, have seen their relative 
positions improve from 2006-2016 as seen by the decrease in their 
incidence of low income. This is particularly noticeable using the WHI 
measure factoring in the in-kind benefits of housing, since homeowners 
benefited over this period from a combination of buoyant house prices and 
rent levels increasing their imputed rents, and near-zero interest rates on 
mortgage repayments for mortgagors. 
 
Table 6. Relative poverty rates by tenure type (%) from 2006-7. 
Relative 
poverty 
Social 
tenants 
(%) 
Private 
tenants 
(%) 
Mortgagors 
(%) 
Outright 
owners 
(%) 
All 
tenures 
(%) 
BHC 35 21 9 22 18 
AHC 48 42 12 16 23 
WHI 28 23 12 17 18 
 
Table 7. Relative poverty rates by tenure type (%) from 2011-12. 
Relative 
poverty 
Social 
tenants 
(%) 
Private 
tenants 
(%) 
Mortgagors 
(%) 
Outright 
owners 
(%) 
All 
tenures 
(%) 
BHC 27 17 10 17 16 
AHC 43 36 12 12 21 
WHI 26 21 11 14 16 
 
Table 8. Relative poverty rates by tenure type (%) 2015-16. 
Relative 
poverty 
Social 
tenants 
(%) 
Private 
tenants 
(%) 
Mortgagors 
(%) 
Outright 
owners 
(%) 
All 
tenures 
(%) 
BHC 29 18 9 18 17 
AHC 45 37 10 13 22 
WHI 30 25 9 13 17 
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Table 9 presents a cross-tabulation of quintiles of BHC income and WHI 
income, telling us the degree of agreement and disagreement between the 
relative rankings of BHC and WHI income. The households whose relative 
positions improve and deteriorate after accounting for housing income 
(WHI) compared to BHC income fall into categories above and below the 
diagonal respectively. We can see that while the majority of households 
remain in the same quintile, a substantial percentage do experience 
improvements and deteriorations in relative position by one quintile. 
 
Table 9. Percentages of households belonging to corresponding 
quintiles equivalised BHC and WHI 2015-16. 
Quintiles 
of BHC 
income 
Quintiles of WHI income 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
1 80.29 13.78 4.59 1.05 0.29 100 
2 15.71 62.98 17.43 3.34 0.55 100 
3 0.16 19.98 60.4 17.89 1.58 100 
4 0.03 0.14 16.35 69.16 14.33 100 
5 0.00 0.00 0.06 11.15 88.79 100 
Total 20.92 20.55 20.22 19.63 18.69 100 
Source: Own calculations from FRS 
Figure 3. Change in relative positions of households from BHC to 
WHI by tenure type 2015-16. 
 
Source: Own calculations from FRS 
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To directly quantify how much the relative positions of individual 
households improve or deteriorate, Figure 3 plots the changes in their 
relative positions in the income distribution from BHC percentile to WHI 
percentile, by tenure type. Pensioners are excluded from the figure because 
low pensioner incomes mean that non home-owning pensioners remain 
near the bottom of the WHI distribution, resulting in bunching at the bottom 
of the tenant distributions of percentile changes. To the left of the zero-
change line, it is clear that all private tenants experience deteriorations in 
their relative positions, since these households receive no housing 
advantages from homeownership nor rent subsidies. Among those whose 
positions improve, the highest proportion are outright homeowners, 
followed by mortgagors (the portion who benefit more from the stream 
housing services provided by their property than is paid out as mortgage 
interest), and slightly lower proportions of social tenants. The figure 
visually illustrates that even though WHI inequality does not greatly differ 
from BHC inequality (as we saw from Table 3 to Table 5), there is 
substantial re-ranking of households within the distribution, such that 
private tenants are at greater risk of relative poverty. 
 
Table 10 presents another a cross-tabulation of quintiles of BHC income, 
this time displaying percentages of households in each BHC quintile that 
find themselves in relative poverty, that is, below 60 per cent of the median, 
with the median recalculated for the BHC, AHC and WHI measures of 
income respectively. A first observation is that the incidence of relative 
poverty is higher when measured using the AHC measure compared to 
using the standard BHC measure, such that households higher up in the 
BHC distribution are at risk of falling into relative poverty after factoring in 
housing costs (though of course, this risk is smaller for higher quintiles). 
For the WHI measure, we see that while some households higher up in the 
BHC distribution do also find themselves in relative poverty once housing 
income is accounted for, there is also a reduction in those in the bottom 
quintile falling into poverty. This is a result of some low-income households 
benefiting from the in-kind advantages of owner-occupation, as well as 
households who benefit from subsidised social rents. 
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Table 10. Percentage of households in each BHC quintile falling into 
BHC and AHC poverty 2015-16. 
Quintiles 
of BHC 
income 
In relative poverty 
BHC AHC 
WHI 
1 81.56 84.12 78.22 
2 0.00 21.2 5.36 
3 0.00 2.49 0.21 
4 0.00 0.28 0.02 
5 0.00 0.02 0.00 
Total 16.63 22.04 16.79 
Source: Own calculations from FRS 
Figure 4 to Figure 6 allow us to visually compare these differences in the 
distribution of households between the BHC measure and the AHC and WHI 
measures by tenure type. Mortgagors tend to have the highest BHC 
incomes on average (the distribution of mortgagors is to the right-hand 
side of all other tenure type distributions). Figure 4 shows that private 
tenants (unfurnished) 2  are better off BHC, on average, than outright 
owners, but less well-off than mortgagors. While we might expect outright 
homeowners to be better off than tenants, inspection of the two groups 
shows that over 55 per cent of outright owners are pensioners, and 
therefore receive relatively low pension incomes. The two groups of social 
tenants are least well-off, as would be expected. 
 
Figure 5 shows the substantial worsening of the relative AHC positions of 
private tenants in comparison to their BHC positions, shown by the leftward 
shift of the private tenants (unfurnished) distribution relative to the other 
tenure distributions. This is accompanied by an improvement in the relative 
position of outright homeowners, shown by the rightward shift of their 
respective distribution relative to the other tenure distributions. Figure 6 
shows the relative improvements, and therefore rightward shifts, of 
households in the distribution for outright owners and the two social tenant 
groups, resulting from the addition of imputed rents and economic 
subsidies to BHC incomes respectively. In both figures, we observe the 
worsening of the situation of private tenants in relation to the other tenancy 
types. 
  
                                                 
2 The proportion of private tenants who rent their accommodation already furnished is 
very small, and so we focus our discussion on the distribution of private tenants in 
unfurnished accommodation. 
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Figure 4. Distribution of BHC income by tenure type 2015-16. 
 
Source: Own calculations from FRS 
 
Figure 5. Distribution of AHC income by tenure type 2015-16. 
 
Source: Own calculations from FRS 
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Figure 6. Distribution of WHI income by tenure type 2015-16. 
 
Source: Own calculations from FRS 
Table 11 shows the net effect on the income distribution in 2015-16 of 
adjusting for housing in the two different ways, by BHC income quintile. 
While the AHC measure shifts the entire distribution of income to the left, 
WHI shifts it to the right. This “translation” effect can therefore affect 
inequality according to inequality measures that are not translation 
invariant, that is, measures that do not produce the same evaluation of 
inequality when the same amount is added or subtracted to all incomes. 
(The Gini and decile ratios are scale invariant, producing the same 
evaluation of inequality when all incomes are multiplied by the same 
amount, but are not translation invariant.) Distributions at lower income 
levels will produce higher degrees of inequality compared to distributions 
with the same shape but shifted to higher income levels.  
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Table 11. Effects of adjusting for housing. 
Quintile BHC AHC WHI 
1 £223.66 £150.46 -
£72.20 
£267.02 
+£43.36 
2 £363.35 £294.82 -
£68.53 
£404.64 
+£41.29 
3 £482.38 £414.52 -
£67.86 
£531.12 
+£48.74 
4 £643.23 £572.33 -
£70.90 
£703.46 
+£60.13 
5 £1284.43 £1188.36 -
£96.07 
£1360.19 
+£75.76 
Source: Own calculations from FRS 
 
4.3 Inequality between second homeowner landlords and 
private tenants 
As Table 12 shows, tenure patterns have evolved over the 10 year period 
from 2006-2016. Though the relative position of homeowners has improved, 
however, there has been a well-documented decline in the proportion of 
new homeowners with mortgages, coinciding with a marked increase in the 
size of the private rented sector. This is due to would-be first-time buyers 
entering, or remaining in, the private rented sector instead of purchasing 
property.  
 
Table 12. Housing tenure (%) from 2006-2016. 
Year Social 
rented 
(%) 
Private 
rented 
(%) 
Mortgagors 
(%) 
Outright 
owners 
(%) 
2006-7 17 11 45 26 
2011-12 16 16 40 27 
2015-16 17 19 36 28 
Source: Own calculations from FRS 
At the same time, second homeownership has increased (Gardiner, 2017), 
though the FRS-HBAI data show that only 3-4 per cent of households let 
out second properties as a means of generating rental income (note that 
these figures include only reported rental income from second homes, and 
therefore cannot capture business income for households who set up 
property rental businesses). Table 13 shows that most of these second 
home landlords are existing homeowners, with the majority of these having 
mortgages. These households have therefore been able to use the 
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additional rental income from second homeownership to offset the cost of 
mortgage repayments and boost their relative positions in the income 
distribution, as well as to acquire an additional asset. 
 
Table 13. Second home landlords by tenure type (%) from 2006-
2016. 
Year Social 
rented 
(%) 
Private 
rented 
(%) 
Mortgagors 
(%) 
Outright 
owners 
(%) 
Percentage 
of 
population  
2006-7 0.5 9 49 39 3 
2011-12 0.4 15 45 37 3 
2015-16 0.3 12 48 38 4 
Source: Own calculations from FRS 
Focusing on the private tenant group, whose relative positions in the 
income distribution decline most upon accounting for housing, what is the 
composition of the least well-off among this group? Table 14 presents a 
breakdown by family type of private tenants falling below 60 per cent of 
median income according to our alternative income measures in 2015-16. 
It shows that families with children (couples and lone parents) comprise 
over 65 per cent of this group. Accounting for housing costs using the AHC 
or WHI measure, lone parents are disproportionately worse-off compared 
to the other family types. 
 
Note that Table 14 presents only private tenants, and therefore the 
incidence for pensioners is very low since most pensioners are outright 
homeowners. The high proportion of pensioners in the outright owners 
group is the reason for the higher incidence of low income for outright 
owners compared to mortgagors in Table 6 to  
Table 8, for example. 
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Table 14. Private tenants in relative poverty according to each 
income measure, broken down by family type 2015-16. 
 Private tenants 
Family type In BHC poverty 
(%) 
In AHC poverty 
(%) 
In WHI 
poverty (%) 
Pensioner couple 1.77 2.53 1.57 
Male pensioner 0.21 0.59 0.23 
Female 
pensioner 
1.21 1.40 1.03 
Couple with 
children 
47.71 46.26 49.63 
Couple no 
children 
12.19 11.20 11.74 
Lone parent 17.62 21.43 19.08 
Single male 11.83 10.02 10.21 
Single female 7.45 6.57 6.50 
Source: Own calculations from FRS 
To compare the value of housing services obtained by private tenants with 
those of other tenant groups, Table 15 presents the observed gross rents 
of private tenants along with the imputed rents of social tenants, 
mortgagors and outright owners by BHC income quintile. These are 
calculated from the hedonic model previously discussed. The predicted 
private tenant rents are also included in the table, showing that our 
imputed estimates are indeed comparable with the observed data. 
 
We see that as would be expected, average predicted market gross rents 
of social tenants are lower than private market rents at each quintile. The 
imputed rents of mortgagors and outright owners tend to be higher than 
observed private rents, except for outright owners in the top quintiles. 
Gross of mortgage interest payments, home-owners therefore appear to 
obtain more value from in-kind housing services than private tenants at 
each BHC income quintile. This is because the value of the benefit that 
homeowners obtain from in-kind housing services is higher, on average, 
than the value of the housing-services that private tenants obtain through 
rent payments. 
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Table 15. Predicted gross rents by BHC income quintile 2015-16. 
BHC 
quintile 
Private 
tenant 
observed 
gross 
rents 
Social 
tenant 
predicted 
market 
gross 
rents 
Private 
tenant 
predicted 
gross 
rents 
Mortgagor 
imputed 
gross 
rents 
Outright 
owner 
imputed 
gross 
rents 
1 £150.32 £138.77 £154.97 £161.71 £177.29 
2 £150.92 £145.26 £160.32 £183.47 £160.00 
3 £160.05 £153.17 £164.67 £204.26 £172.16 
4 £188.49 £147.63 £182.98 £269.80 £183.45 
5 £250.84 £159.69 £241.38 £304.60 £240.34 
Source: Own calculations from FRS 
The benefits from in-kind housing services are not only distributed 
unequally across tenure types and income quintiles, but also geographically. 
Table 16 presents the imputed net rents of owner-occupiers by region, and 
as a proportion of BHC income. The “London effect” can be clearly seen, 
showing that homeowners in London benefit disproportionately from the 
value of in-kind housing services, and well as from actual rental income for 
second homeowner landlords. By the same token, this means that private 
tenants in London are disproportionately worse-off relative to homeowners 
in comparison to in other regions of the UK. 
 
Table 16. BHC and WHI income by region 2015-16. 
Region BHC 
income 
Imputed 
rent 
Proportion 
North East £487.55 £118.30 0.24 
North West £509.93 £122.94 0.24 
Yorks and The 
Humber 
£500.09 £119.93 0.24 
East Midlands £519.52 £113.74 0.22 
West Midlands £509.36 £131.01 0.26 
East of England £631.34 £166.98 0.26 
London £658.86 £315.23 0.48 
South East £647.31 £167.01 0.26 
South West £556.27 £144.28 0.26 
Wales £479.75 £108.47 0.23 
Scotland £540.97 £123.99 0.23 
Northern Ireland £466.85 £87.39 0.19 
Source: Own calculations from FRS 
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In addition to this inequality in the value of housing services, the outgoing 
rents paid by a portion of private tenants for these housing services are 
directly transferred as rental income to second homeowners who let out 
their second homes. As Table 13 shows, the vast majority of these second 
homeowners also own their primary accommodation (as opposed to second 
homeowners who rent their primary accommodation), thereby contributing 
to the inequality between private tenants and homeowners. These transfers 
of rent are captured in BHC (as well as AHC and WHI) income figures, and 
are therefore already incorporated into the inequality figures in Table 3 to 
Table 5. Counterfactual inequality in absence of these rent transfers is 
examined in the next section of the paper. 
 
To investigate which parts of the income distribution these private rent 
transfers originate from and are transferred to, Table 17 presents the mean 
gross rental income of second homeowners who let out their property, 
broken down by BHC income quintile. Comparing these figures to the 
observed gross private rents in the first column of Table 15, we see that 
the mean private rent for even the lowest BHC quintile, £150.32, is higher 
than the mean rental income received by second homeowners in the 
highest BHC quintile, £126.50. Although we must acknowledge that the 
data captures rental income only very imperfectly, the indication of this is 
that the rents directly transferred from private tenants to second 
homeowners (and not recorded as other business income from households 
who set up property rental companies) primarily go to second homeowners 
at the very top of the income distribution. 
 
Further breaking down rental incomes within the top income quintile, Table 
17 also presents mean rental income of second homeowners in the 9th and 
10th decile, and in the top 5% and 2% of BHC income. It appears that only 
in the top decile does mean second homeowner rental income, £151.14, 
match the mean rents paid by private tenants in the bottom quintile. Taking 
instead median rental income instead of the mean, the corresponding 
income group of second homeowners is the top 2% of households. This 
reinforces the observed pattern of rents that are paid out from private 
tenant households, who are made relatively worse off, and that are 
transferred upwards in the income distribution to second home-owning 
households concentrated at the very top of the income distribution. 
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Table 17. Mean and median gross rental income for second 
homeowners, by income group. 
 Second homeowners 
BHC Quintile Mean rental income Median rental 
income 
1 £84.68 £34.43 
2 £62.35 £57.38 
3 £76.91 £32.97 
4 £86.52 £47.81 
5 £126.50 £68.85 
BHC Decile Mean rental income Median rental 
income 
9 £79.48 £47.81 
10 £151.14 £86.85 
BHC 
Percentile 
Mean rental income Median rental 
income 
Top 5% £183.32 £114.75 
Top 2% £263.35 £206.56 
Source: Own calculations from FRS 
Table 18 profiles the characteristics of second homeowners and the value 
of their properties, including both those who let out these properties and 
those who do not. Unlike the rest of the analysis, which uses FRS data, this 
data is taken from the Wealth and Assets Survey (WAS). We see that while 
second homeowners in the lowest income quintile are comprised mainly of 
households headed by older, non-employed females, who are likely to be 
single-householder retirees, in the higher income quintiles these 
characteristics gradually shift in profile to households headed by younger 
employed males. 
 
Table 18. Household head characteristics of second homeowners. 
BHC 
Quintile 
Aged 55 and 
over (%) 
Female 
(%) 
Employed 
(%) 
Value of 
property (£) 
1 71.31 53.00 31.67 £196,890 
2 58.90 48.00 59.68 £218,764 
3 59.57 40.61 60.51 £201,131 
4 48.87 34.25 71.30 £200,407 
5 41.33 24.98 83.17 £379,254 
Source: Own calculations from WAS Wave 5 (2014-16) 
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4.4 Counterfactual distributions without second homeowner 
rental income transfers 
To quantify how much the flows of rent from private tenants to second 
homeowners contribute to overall income inequality, we recalculate levels 
of inequality in counterfactual scenarios where the rental income received 
by second homeowners is reallocated back to private renting households. 
In generating each counterfactual, a subset of private tenant households 
must be selected to whom the rents are reallocated. This is because we 
cannot observe which households the transfers of rent are actually made 
between – indeed many of these households may not appear in the dataset 
– and the total rental income to be reallocated comprises just a small 
fraction of total private tenant rents. By carefully selecting subsets, 
however, upper and lower bounds can be estimated for the effect on 
inequality and poverty of removing these rent transfers. 
 
The assumptions underlying the selection of private tenant subsets for each 
counterfactual scenario are as follows: 
 
Scenario 1: Assume that second homeowner rental income is reallocated to 
private tenants with the lowest rents, ordered by level of rent. 
This generates an upper bound for the number of private tenant 
households to whom rents are reallocated. 
Scenario 2: Assume that second homeowner rental income is reallocated to 
private tenants with the highest rents, ordered by level of rent. 
This generates a lower bound for the number of private tenant 
households to whom rents are reallocated. 
Scenario 3: Assume that second homeowner rental income is reallocated to 
private tenants with the lowest BHC incomes. This generates 
an upper bound estimate of the degree to which overall income 
inequality is reduced as a result of the rent reallocations. 
Scenario 4: Assume that second homeowner rental income is reallocated to 
private tenants with the highest BHC incomes. This generates 
a lower bound estimate of the degree to which overall income 
inequality is reduced as a result of the rent reallocations. 
 
We could arrive at scenarios 1 and 3 if, for example, the ownership of 
second homes was transferred from current second homeowners to the 
lowest rent-paying or poorest private tenant households respectively. 
Similarly, we could arrive at scenarios 2 and 4 if the ownership of second 
homes was transferred from current second homeowners to the highest 
rent-paying or most well-off private tenant households. 
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Counterfactual AHC income inequality under each of the four scenarios is 
presented in Table 19, along with actual AHC inequality as a point of 
comparison. Since the BHC and WHI measures do not capture changes in 
the outgoing rents of private tenants, these are therefore not included in 
the counterfactual inequality recalculations. 
 
Under all counterfactual scenarios, the degree of inequality is reduced in 
comparison to actual AHC inequality, as would be expected. The Gini 
coefficient falls from 0.39 for AHC income inequality to 0.36 in each of the 
counterfactual scenarios. While the P90/P50 and P50/P10 ratios also fall in 
comparison to their AHC values, there are variations between scenarios 
that result from their greater sensitivity to the choice of assumptions made 
under each scenario (see scenario assumptions above). Under scenario 2, 
the inequality-reducing effect on the P90/P50 and P50/P10 ratios of 
reallocating to the highest rent payers is smaller than under scenario 1, 
since relatively few private tenants are affected by this arrangement due 
to the fixed value of second homeowner rental income to be reallocated. 
Under scenario 1, reallocating to the lowest rent payers means that the 
total value of reallocated second homeowner rental income is shared 
among many more private tenant households. Since private tenant 
households with the lowest rents will also tend to be the poorer households, 
this counterfactual reallocation has a greater inequality-reducing effect in 
comparison to the actual AHC distribution. 
 
The greatest inequality-reducing effect on the P90/P50 ratio occurs under 
scenario 1, from 2.13 to 2.08, while the greatest inequality-reducing effect 
on the P50/P10 ratio occurs under scenario 3, from 2.30 to 2.15, in which 
second homeowner rental income is reallocated to the lowest-income 
private tenant households. To interpret this, note that under scenario 3, 
the counterfactual is constructed such that the reduction in inequality is 
generated by transfers to the poorest households, so that this effect is 
concentrated in the bottom half of the income distribution. The P50/P10 
ratio captures this effect. On the other hand, under scenario 1, the private 
tenant households with the lowest rents do not necessarily coincide with 
those with the lowest incomes, and so transfers may be received by private 
tenant households dispersed more widely up and down the income 
distribution. Therefore, the inequality-reducing effect generated by 
transfers to private tenant households combined with the effect generated 
by transfers from higher-income second homeowners appears to have a 
greater effect on the upper half of the income distribution in comparison to 
scenario 3. 
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As noted in the scenario assumptions, scenarios 2 and 4 provide lower 
bounds on the estimated inequality-reducing effect. Table 19 confirms that 
the P90/P50 and P50/P10 ratios do indeed fall by smaller degrees in 
comparison to the other two scenarios, though inequality does still decrease. 
 
Table 19. Counterfactual AHC scenarios with second homeowner 
rental income reallocated to private tenants with the lowest rents 
in 2015-16. 
Measure Gini P90/P50 P50/P10 
AHC 0.39 2.13 2.30 
Scenario 1 0.36 2.08 2.23 
Scenario 2 0.36 2.11 2.26 
Scenario 3 0.36 2.10 2.15 
Scenario 4 0.36 2.11 2.26 
Source: Own calculations from FRS 
The explicit effect of the counterfactual rent reallocations on relative 
poverty is presented in Table 20. In line with the results from the 
counterfactual inequality figures, the poverty figures show that scenario 3 
evidently provides the sharpest reduction in poverty compared to the AHC 
relative poverty rate. 
 
Table 20. Relative poverty rates under the counterfactual scenarios 
2015-16. 
 AHC Scenario 
1 
Scenario 
2 
Scenario 
3 
Scenario 
4 
Relative 
poverty 
rate 
22.04% 21.04% 20.99% 19.83% 20.99% 
Source: Own calculations from FRS 
Finally, Figure 7 illustrates graphically the changes to the AHC income 
distribution of private tenants and second homeowners who let out their 
homes, as a result of the rent reallocations under the four counterfactual 
scenario assumptions. We can clearly see the contraction of the bottom tail 
of the private tenant income distribution up towards the relative poverty 
line3 under scenario 3, which generates the reductions in inequality and 
poverty observed in the previous set of results. The inequality-reducing 
downward shift of second home landlords can also clearly be seen, although 
                                                 
3 The position of the relative poverty line does not change much under each of the 
counterfactual scenarios, since it is calculated across all tenancy types, most of which do 
not change under the counterfactuals. Therefore, only the AHC poverty line is shown in 
the figure.  
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the incomes of these households remain distributed around much higher 
incomes than those of the private tenant group. 
 
Figure 7. Private tenant and second home landlord income 
distributions under counterfactual scenarios in 2015-16. 
 
Source: Own calculations from FRS 
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5 Summary 
In this paper we have examined how inequality from the interaction of 
income and housing circumstances changes the relative position of 
households in the income distribution, and influences the incidence and 
socio-demographic profile of those in housing-induced poverty. We used 
three measures of income – the standard Before Housing Costs (BHC) 
measure, and the After Housing Costs (AHC) and With Housing Income 
(WHI) measures which adjust for housing in two different ways – to analyse 
the net effect of housing costs and advantages on poverty and inequality, 
and the underlying distributional changes linking the two. 
 
We find that inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient has not changed 
substantially in the period from 2006 to 2016, although this masks some 
changes in dispersion between the median and the top and bottom deciles 
of the income distribution. Inequality according to the AHC measure is 
consistently higher compared to the BHC measure, in part due to the fact 
that the housing cost deductions in the AHC income measure are larger 
relative to BHC income for those with lower BHC incomes, and in part due 
to the translation effect of all incomes shifting to lower absolute levels 
compared to the BHC baseline. The higher AHC inequality relative to BHC 
inequality is driven by the worsening positions of tenants near the bottom 
of the income distribution. Inequality according to the WHI measure is 
much more similar to BHC inequality; however, this hides substantial re-
ranking of households within the distribution, such that private tenants are 
at greater risk of relative poverty. The smaller difference in WHI inequality 
relative to BHC inequality is due to the improved positions of social tenants 
lower down the income distribution accompanied by improved positions 
homeowners higher up the distribution, so that the overall income 
distribution does not become more or less dispersed. 
 
The incidence of relative poverty fell between 2006-7 and 2011-12 as 
income dispersion contracted in the aftermath of the financial crisis, and 
then rose again from 2011-12 to 2015-16 during the recovery. Relative 
poverty is higher when measured using the AHC measure compared to 
using the standard BHC measure, such that households higher up in the 
BHC distribution are at risk of falling into relative poverty after factoring in 
housing costs. For the WHI measure, we see that while some households 
higher up in the BHC distribution do also find themselves in relative WHI 
poverty once housing income is accounted for, there is also a reduction in 
those in the bottom BHC quintile falling into WHI poverty. 
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Focusing on private tenants, whose positions in the income distribution 
deteriorate most relative to other tenure types according to both housing-
adjusted measures, BHC and WHI, we find that families with children 
(couples and lone parents) comprise over 65 per cent of this group. 
Accounting for housing costs and advantages using the AHC or WHI 
measure, lone parents are disproportionately worse-off relative to the BHC 
baseline compared to the other family types.  
 
Decomposing housing inequalities by region, the “London effect” is evident, 
with homeowners in London benefiting disproportionately from the value of 
in-kind housing advantages, and private tenants in London 
disproportionately worse-off relative to homeowners in comparison to 
private tenants in other regions of the UK. This not only widens the income 
disparity between homeowners and private tenants, but in particular 
between private tenants and second home-owning landlords, who receive 
additional rental income from private tenants and also acquire an additional 
asset. 
 
The analysis of counterfactual scenarios, removing this second homeowner 
rental income and reallocating it back to subsets of private tenants, shows 
that this has varying but universally inequality-reducing effects on AHC 
income inequality. The greatest poverty-reducing effect comes from 
reallocating second homeowner rental income to private tenant households 
with the lowest BHC incomes, which could hypothetically be arrived at by 
transferring the ownership of second homes of current second homeowners 
to the poorest private tenant households. 
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Appendix: Hedonic regression results 
5.1.1 London, A level or lower educated 2015-16 
N = 138   
Robust 
  
Log of rent Coef. Std. 
Err. 
t P>t 
     
REGION 
    
London 0 (omitte
d) 
  
     
REGION#COUNCIL TAX 
    
London#GB: Band B -0.441 0.311 -1.420 0.160 
London#GB: Band C -0.227 0.295 -0.770 0.445 
London#GB: Band D -0.196 0.310 -0.630 0.528 
London#GB: Band E -0.328 0.365 -0.900 0.371 
London#GB: Band F 0.034 0.360 0.090 0.926 
London#GB: Band G 0.595 0.358 1.660 0.099 
London#GB: Band H -0.227 0.348 -0.650 0.515      
ACCOMMODATION TYPE 
    
Whole house/bungalow, semi-
detached 
0.113 0.307 0.370 0.715 
Whole house/bungalow, terraced 0.176 0.304 0.580 0.564 
Purpose-built flat or maisonette 0.273 0.324 0.840 0.401 
Converted house/building 0.291 0.333 0.880 0.383 
Other -0.157 0.496 -0.320 0.752      
ROOMS 0.179 0.052 3.460 0.001      
FURNISHED STATUS 
    
Partially Furnished -0.118 0.082 -1.450 0.151 
Unfurnished -0.201 0.090 -2.240 0.027      
Constant 4.856 0.498 9.740 0.000 
 
5.1.2 London, degree level or higher educated 2015-16 
N=185   
Robust 
  
 47 
Log of rent Coef. Std. Err. t P>t      
REGION 
    
London 0 (omitted) 
  
     
REGION#COUNCIL TAX 
    
London#GB: Band B 0.201 0.184 1.090 0.278 
London#GB: Band C 0.328 0.184 1.780 0.077 
London#GB: Band D 0.321 0.187 1.720 0.088 
London#GB: Band E 0.480 0.212 2.260 0.025 
London#GB: Band F 0.552 0.304 1.810 0.071 
London#GB: Band G 0.984 0.355 2.770 0.006 
London#GB: Band H 0.743 0.483 1.540 0.126  
    
ACCOMMODATION TYPE     
Whole house/bungalow, 
semi-detached 0.684 0.456 1.500 0.136 
Whole house/bungalow, 
terraced 0.361 0.467 0.770 0.441 
Purpose-built flat or 
maisonette 0.261 0.480 0.540 0.587 
Converted house/building 0.380 0.484 0.780 0.434 
Other -0.410 0.539 -0.760 0.448  
    
ROOMS 0.060 0.042 1.420 0.159  
    
FURNISHED STATUS     
Partially Furnished -0.029 0.063 -0.460 0.649 
Unfurnished -0.102 0.093 -1.100 0.274  
    
Constant 4.786 0.531 9.020 0.000 
 
5.1.3 Non-London, A level or lower 
N = 1480   
Robust 
  
Log of rent Coef. Std. Err. t P>t      
REGION 
    
North West 0.070 0.052 1.360 0.174 
Yorks and the Humber 0.019 0.064 0.300 0.763 
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East Midlands 0.063 0.051 1.240 0.214 
West Midlands 0.132 0.056 2.350 0.019 
East of England 0.316 0.058 5.440 0.000 
South East 0.460 0.072 6.370 0.000 
South West 0.058 0.100 0.580 0.561 
Wales -0.063 0.062 -1.010 0.313 
Scotland -0.087 0.070 -1.240 0.214 
Northern Ireland 0.670 0.061 10.890 0.000      
REGION#COUNCIL TAX 
    
North East#GB: Band B 0.610 0.191 3.200 0.001 
North East#GB: Band C 0.675 0.246 2.740 0.006 
North East#GB: Band D 0.130 0.043 3.030 0.002 
North East#GB: Band E 0.983 0.262 3.760 0.000 
North East#GB: Band F 0.000 (empty) 
  
North East#GB: Band G 0.000 (empty) 
  
North East#GB: Band H 0.000 (empty) 
  
North West#GB: Band B 0.190 0.072 2.650 0.008 
North West#GB: Band C 0.319 0.096 3.320 0.001 
North West#GB: Band D 0.252 0.153 1.650 0.100 
North West#GB: Band E 0.236 0.483 0.490 0.625 
North West#GB: Band F 1.343 0.129 10.430 0.000 
North West#GB: Band G 0.000 (empty) 
  
North West#GB: Band H 0.367 0.060 6.110 0.000 
Yorks and the Humber#GB: 
Band B 
0.066 0.088 0.750 0.451 
Yorks and the Humber#GB: 
Band C 
0.220 0.112 1.970 0.050 
Yorks and the Humber#GB: 
Band D 
0.277 0.110 2.510 0.012 
Yorks and the Humber#GB: 
Band E 
0.738 0.107 6.900 0.000 
Yorks and the Humber#GB: 
Band F 
0.718 0.061 11.830 0.000 
Yorks and the Humber#GB: 
Band G 
0.354 0.098 3.620 0.000 
Yorks and the Humber#GB: 
Band H 
0.494 0.544 0.910 0.364 
East Midlands#GB: Band B 0.181 0.059 3.090 0.002 
East Midlands#GB: Band C 0.390 0.067 5.830 0.000 
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East Midlands#GB: Band D 0.159 0.077 2.060 0.040 
East Midlands#GB: Band E 0.442 0.158 2.800 0.005 
East Midlands#GB: Band F 0.000 (empty) 
  
East Midlands#GB: Band G 0.000 (empty) 
  
East Midlands#GB: Band H -0.913 0.034 -26.640 0.000 
West Midlands#GB: Band B 0.096 0.058 1.660 0.098 
West Midlands#GB: Band C 0.261 0.074 3.530 0.000 
West Midlands#GB: Band D 0.312 0.102 3.060 0.002 
West Midlands#GB: Band E 0.741 0.170 4.370 0.000 
West Midlands#GB: Band F 0.909 0.061 15.010 0.000 
West Midlands#GB: Band G 0.399 0.091 4.380 0.000 
West Midlands#GB: Band H 0.107 0.169 0.640 0.525 
East of England#GB: Band B 0.095 0.056 1.700 0.090 
East of England#GB: Band C 0.129 0.113 1.140 0.256 
East of England#GB: Band D 0.331 0.113 2.920 0.004 
East of England#GB: Band E 0.745 0.109 6.850 0.000 
East of England#GB: Band F 0.794 0.132 6.020 0.000 
East of England#GB: Band G 0.000 (empty) 
  
East of England#GB: Band H -0.865 0.323 -2.680 0.007 
South East#GB: Band B 0.075 0.071 1.060 0.290 
South East#GB: Band C 0.106 0.068 1.560 0.118 
South East#GB: Band D 0.027 0.153 0.170 0.862 
South East#GB: Band E -0.027 0.196 -0.140 0.891 
South East#GB: Band F 0.911 0.087 10.460 0.000 
South East#GB: Band G -0.759 0.092 -8.260 0.000 
South East#GB: Band H -0.451 0.293 -1.540 0.124 
South West#GB: Band B 0.254 0.105 2.410 0.016 
South West#GB: Band C 0.445 0.116 3.830 0.000 
South West#GB: Band D 0.210 0.188 1.120 0.264 
South West#GB: Band E 0.172 0.390 0.440 0.659 
South West#GB: Band F 1.477 0.119 12.360 0.000 
South West#GB: Band G 0.000 (empty) 
  
South West#GB: Band H -0.041 0.256 -0.160 0.872 
Wales#GB: Band B -0.029 0.126 -0.230 0.816 
Wales#GB: Band C 0.202 0.063 3.210 0.001 
Wales#GB: Band D 0.280 0.101 2.780 0.005 
Wales#GB: Band E 0.257 0.106 2.430 0.015 
Wales#GB: Band F 0.766 0.083 9.210 0.000 
Wales#GB: Band G 0.816 0.165 4.940 0.000 
Wales#GB: Band H 0.084 0.051 1.630 0.104 
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Scotland#GB: Band B 0.083 0.082 1.010 0.313 
Scotland#GB: Band C 0.146 0.112 1.300 0.195 
Scotland#GB: Band D 0.367 0.138 2.660 0.008 
Scotland#GB: Band E 0.496 0.133 3.740 0.000 
Scotland#GB: Band F 1.206 0.185 6.520 0.000 
Scotland#GB: Band G 0.000 (empty) 
  
Scotland#GB: Band H -0.010 0.197 -0.050 0.960 
Northern Ireland#NI: Band 1 -0.768 0.055 -13.950 0.000 
Northern Ireland#NI: Band 2 -0.726 0.050 -14.410 0.000 
Northern Ireland#NI: Band 3 -0.683 0.065 -10.580 0.000 
Northern Ireland#NI: Band 4 -0.713 0.080 -8.960 0.000 
Northern Ireland#NI: Band 5 -0.448 0.072 -6.240 0.000 
Northern Ireland#NI: Band 6 -0.306 0.236 -1.300 0.195 
Northern Ireland#NI: Band 7 0.000 (omitted) 
  
     
ACCOMMODATION TYPE 
    
Whole house/bungalow, 
semi-detached 
0.149 0.068 2.190 0.029 
Whole house/bungalow, 
terraced 
0.175 0.071 2.450 0.014 
Purpose-built flat or 
maisonette 
0.256 0.079 3.240 0.001 
Converted house/building 0.163 0.085 1.910 0.057 
Caravan/Mobile home or 
Houseboat 
-0.136 0.153 -0.890 0.376 
Other 0.474 0.163 2.910 0.004      
ROOMS 0.060 0.012 5.160 0.000      
FURNISHED STATUS 
    
Partially Furnished -0.137 0.047 -2.930 0.003 
Unfurnished -0.133 0.043 -3.110 0.002      
Constant 4.245 0.111 38.180 0.000 
 
5.1.4 Non-London, degree level or higher educated 
N=845   
Robust 
  
Log of rent Coef. Std. Err. t P>t      
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REGION 
    
North West 0.045 0.105 0.430 0.667 
Yorks and the Humber 0.092 0.096 0.950 0.340 
East Midlands 0.018 0.104 0.180 0.860 
West Midlands 0.257 0.104 2.460 0.014 
East of England 0.315 0.108 2.910 0.004 
South East 0.366 0.107 3.420 0.001 
South West 0.287 0.101 2.850 0.005 
Wales -0.056 0.112 -0.500 0.616 
Scotland -0.065 0.121 -0.540 0.592 
Northern Ireland 0.431 0.086 5.010 0.000      
REGION#COUNCIL TAX 
    
North East#GB: Band B 0.092 0.160 0.580 0.565 
North East#GB: Band C 0.078 0.180 0.440 0.663 
North East#GB: Band D 0.076 0.097 0.790 0.432 
North East#GB: Band E 0.523 0.108 4.860 0.000 
North East#GB: Band F 0.000 (empty) 
  
North East#GB: Band G 0.000 (empty) 
  
North East#GB: Band H 0.000 (empty) 
  
North West#GB: Band B 0.196 0.076 2.580 0.010 
North West#GB: Band C 0.384 0.098 3.900 0.000 
North West#GB: Band D -0.011 0.077 -0.140 0.885 
North West#GB: Band E 1.140 0.112 10.180 0.000 
North West#GB: Band F 0.000 (empty) 
  
North West#GB: Band G 0.000 (empty) 
  
North West#GB: Band H -0.911 0.083 -10.950 0.000 
Yorks and the Humber#GB: 
Band B 
0.122 0.050 2.440 0.015 
Yorks and the Humber#GB: 
Band C 
0.314 0.091 3.430 0.001 
Yorks and the Humber#GB: 
Band D 
0.257 0.068 3.780 0.000 
Yorks and the Humber#GB: 
Band E 
0.660 0.244 2.710 0.007 
Yorks and the Humber#GB: 
Band F 
0.477 0.319 1.500 0.135 
Yorks and the Humber#GB: 
Band G 
0.000 (empty) 
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Yorks and the Humber#GB: 
Band H 
-0.126 0.529 -0.240 0.812 
East Midlands#GB: Band B 0.108 0.085 1.280 0.202 
East Midlands#GB: Band C 0.081 0.153 0.530 0.595 
East Midlands#GB: Band D -0.173 0.714 -0.240 0.808 
East Midlands#GB: Band E 0.000 (empty) 
  
East Midlands#GB: Band F 0.937 0.244 3.850 0.000 
East Midlands#GB: Band G 0.000 (empty) 
  
East Midlands#GB: Band H 0.246 0.101 2.420 0.016 
West Midlands#GB: Band B -0.024 0.069 -0.350 0.729 
West Midlands#GB: Band C 0.155 0.070 2.200 0.028 
West Midlands#GB: Band D 0.318 0.092 3.450 0.001 
West Midlands#GB: Band E 0.524 0.161 3.250 0.001 
West Midlands#GB: Band F -0.401 0.534 -0.750 0.453 
West Midlands#GB: Band G 0.000 (empty) 
  
West Midlands#GB: Band H 0.008 0.155 0.050 0.961 
East of England#GB: Band B 0.138 0.072 1.930 0.054 
East of England#GB: Band C 0.229 0.093 2.470 0.014 
East of England#GB: Band D 0.520 0.123 4.210 0.000 
East of England#GB: Band E -0.006 0.333 -0.020 0.986 
East of England#GB: Band F 0.763 0.219 3.480 0.001 
East of England#GB: Band G 0.864 0.083 10.440 0.000 
East of England#GB: Band H 0.000 (empty) 
  
South East#GB: Band B 0.144 0.082 1.750 0.080 
South East#GB: Band C 0.248 0.077 3.230 0.001 
South East#GB: Band D 0.491 0.094 5.220 0.000 
South East#GB: Band E 0.386 0.128 3.010 0.003 
South East#GB: Band F 0.889 0.128 6.970 0.000 
South East#GB: Band G -0.270 0.714 -0.380 0.706 
South East#GB: Band H 0.983 0.557 1.760 0.078 
South West#GB: Band B 0.001 0.084 0.010 0.991 
South West#GB: Band C 0.183 0.082 2.230 0.026 
South West#GB: Band D 0.093 0.176 0.530 0.595 
South West#GB: Band E 0.211 0.165 1.280 0.202 
South West#GB: Band F -0.033 0.310 -0.110 0.915 
South West#GB: Band G 0.719 0.273 2.630 0.009 
South West#GB: Band H 0.294 0.464 0.630 0.527 
Wales#GB: Band B 0.036 0.103 0.350 0.728 
Wales#GB: Band C 0.177 0.076 2.340 0.020 
Wales#GB: Band D 0.071 0.126 0.560 0.573 
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Wales#GB: Band E 0.363 0.101 3.580 0.000 
Wales#GB: Band F 0.646 0.100 6.440 0.000 
Wales#GB: Band G 0.000 (empty) 
  
Wales#GB: Band H 0.000 (empty) 
  
Scotland#GB: Band B 0.175 0.105 1.680 0.094 
Scotland#GB: Band C 0.222 0.102 2.180 0.030 
Scotland#GB: Band D 0.206 0.180 1.140 0.253 
Scotland#GB: Band E 0.399 0.175 2.280 0.023 
Scotland#GB: Band F 0.012 0.577 0.020 0.983 
Scotland#GB: Band G 1.178 0.184 6.390 0.000 
Scotland#GB: Band H 0.023 0.224 0.100 0.918 
Northern Ireland#NI: Band 1 -0.626 0.067 -9.280 0.000 
Northern Ireland#NI: Band 2 -0.651 0.105 -6.190 0.000 
Northern Ireland#NI: Band 3 -0.447 0.061 -7.350 0.000 
Northern Ireland#NI: Band 4 -0.284 0.070 -4.040 0.000 
Northern Ireland#NI: Band 5 -0.174 0.114 -1.530 0.125 
Northern Ireland#NI: Band 6 0.000 (omitted) 
  
     
ACCOMMODATION TYPE 
    
Whole house/bungalow, 
semi-detached 
-0.057 0.057 -1.000 0.320 
Whole house/bungalow, 
terraced 
0.021 0.053 0.390 0.697 
Purpose-built flat or 
maisonette 
0.108 0.055 1.960 0.051 
Converted house/building 0.071 0.066 1.070 0.284 
Caravan/Mobile home or 
Houseboat 
-0.568 0.075 -7.560 0.000 
Other -0.320 0.528 -0.610 0.545      
ROOMS 0.065 0.015 4.290 0.000      
FURNISHED STATUS 
    
Partially Furnished 0.000 0.042 -0.010 0.994 
Unfurnished 0.000 0.040 0.010 0.994      
Constant 4.269 0.135 31.550 0.000 
 
